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Abstract
In the 2001 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), 27% of households report simulta-
neously revolving significant credit card debt and holding sizeable amounts of liquid assets.
These consumers report paying, on average, a 14% interest rate on their debt, while earning
only 1 or 2% on their liquid deposit accounts. This phenomenon is known as the “credit card
debt puzzle”, as it appears to violate the standard no-arbitrage condition. In this paper, I
quantitatively evaluate demand for liquidity as an explanation for this puzzle: households
that accumulate credit card debt may not pay it off using their money in the bank, because
they expect to use that money in situations where credit cards cannot be used. Using both
aggregate and survey data (SCF and CEX), I document that liquid assets are a substan-
tial part of households’ portfolios and that consumption in goods requiring liquid payments
appears to have a sizeable unpredictable component. This would warrant holding positive
balances in liquid accounts both for transactions and precautionary purposes. I develop
a dynamic heterogeneous-agent model of household portfolio choice, where households are
subject to uninsurable income and preference uncertainty, and consumer credit and liquidity
coexist as means of consumption and saving/borrowing. The calibration of the model pa-
rameters is based on the simulated method of moments. The calibrated model accounts for
between 85% and 104% of the households in the data who hold consumer debt and liquidity
simultaneously, and for between 56 and 62 cents of every dollar held by a median household
in the puzzle group. Thus the transactions and precautionary demand for liquidity appear
to be a significant factor in accounting for the credit card debt puzzle.
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1 Introduction
In the 2001 U.S. Survey of Consumer Finances, 27% of households reported revolving an average
of $5,766 in credit card debt, with an APR of 14%, and simultaneously, holding an average of
$7,338 in liquid assets, with a return rate of around 1%. In fact, 84% of households who revolved
credit card debt had some liquid assets that could be, but were not, used for credit card debt
repayment. This apparent violation of the no-arbitrage condition has been termed the “credit
card debt puzzle”.
Gross and Souleles (2002) were among the first to document this fact. They suggested several
possible explanations for this behavior, two of which have been pursued in the literature since
then. Lehnert & Maki (2001) study whether households may do this strategically, in preparation
for a bankruptcy filing. Since in the U.S., each state offers some exemption level of assets in
the event of a household bankruptcy filing, the authors argue that households may run up their
credit card debt since it would be discharged during the filing, while keeping their assets in
liquid form, in order to convert them to exemptible assets when filing. The authors examine
exemption level by state, and find that in states where exemption levels are higher, the puzzle
is more prevalent. While this may be a compelling idea to a small number of households in
question, upon examination of the total portfolios of the puzzle households, it appears that
most of them would be unlikely to file for bankruptcy, as they hold significant and positive
financial and nonfinancial wealth. I will present the relevant evidence below.
Alternatively, Bertaut and Haliassos (2002), and Haliassos and Reiter (2003) have studied
whether households may opt to hold both liquidity and credit card debt simultaneously as a
means of self- (or spouse) control. If one spouse in the household is the earner, and the other
is the compulsive shopper, it is argued that the earner will choose not to pay off credit card
debt in full in order to leave less of the credit line open for the shopper to spend. This again
may apply to some share of households, but is unlikely to account for many of the households
in the puzzle category, since it is a costly way of performing this kind of control. A household
in the puzzle group loses, on average, $734 per year, largely from the costs of debt revolving,
which amounts to 1.5% of their total annual after-tax income. Less expensive control options
are available, such as lowering the credit limit or holding fewer credit cards.
Laibson et al (2001) examine a related puzzle: the coexistence in household portfolios of
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credit card debt and retirement assets. The difference is key: retirement assets, such as IRA
accounts, are nonliquid and involve a significant penalty for early withdrawal. The authors
explain this behavior with time-inconsistent decision-making by households, which makes them
patient in the long run, but impatient in the short run. The explanation cannot apply to the
credit card debt puzzle, however, because the tradeoff here is between two short-run decisions,
and because liquid asset withdrawal does not incur a penalty, which makes the behavior more
puzzling still from this perspective.
Although the existing explanations for the credit card debt puzzle may have merit for some
households, there may be many households whose behavior they are not likely to capture,
for reasons mentioned above. In this paper, I offer a rigorous examination of an alternative
hypothesis of why a household may choose rationally to hold liquid assets and revolve credit
card debt simultaneously, and evaluate how much of the puzzle it can account for. I focus
on the need for liquidity as the possible reason. The premise is that there are large parts of
household monthly expenditures that cannot be paid for by credit card, so they must be paid
by liquid instruments.1 Such payments often are substantial in size, and include predicted
expenses (such as mortgage and rent payments, utilities, babysitting and daycare services), as
well as significant unpredictable ones (such as major household repairs, auto repairs and other
types of emergencies).2 Some of these are universally cash-only goods, while others may or may
not be. For example, large auto dealerships accept credit cards, but smaller mechanics more
trusted by households may not. All of these expenses warrant keeping money in the bank. Thus,
even for a household that has accumulated credit card debt, drawing down its liquid assets below
some threshold is not an optimal choice, and the household may prioritize building its liquid
asset holdings over debt repayment in the short to medium run. The unpredictable nature of
some of the expenditures requiring payment by a check, say, may warrant holding fairly large
liquid balances for precautionary reasons, as inability to pay if emergency strikes may be very
costly.
Gross and Souleles (2002) mention the idea of transactions demand for liquidity as a possible
contributor to why people hold debt and money simultaneously, but dismiss it as insufficient for
1I use the term “liquid assets” such as checks, debit cards and savings accounts, interchangeably with “money”
and “cash”, since their liquidity properties are the same for my purposes.
2Below, I discuss the survey evidence of the fact that such goods tend to be cash-only goods.
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the purposes of explaining the puzzle. A careful quantitative analysis of the hypothesis presented
here, however, is an involved exercise, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, and it is
crucial, because it allows us to evaluate the possibility that the puzzle may largely fit within the
standard rational expectations framework, and hence appear much less puzzling in that context.
Crucially, I am interested in understanding the nature and magnitude of not only transactions
demand, but also precautionary demand for liquidity, and in linking it to the puzzle in question.
The main goal of this paper is to measure how much of the puzzle the liquidity need hy-
pothesis can account for. Specifically, I answer the following two questions: (1) Can the need
for liquidity explain why so many households revolve debt while having money in the bank?;
and (2) How much liquidity is it optimal for a household to have, given the risk characteristics
that it is exposed to, especially if it revolves credit card debt?
I use data from the Survey of Consumer Finances and the Consumer Expenditure Survey
to study characteristics of households who choose to borrow on credit cards and save in liquid
accounts simultaneously. I will show that there is nothing inherent about them, from a demo-
graphic perspective, that would distinguish them from other households, so that the phenomenon
may have economic causes. I will also show evidence that gives support to the importance of
liquid assets in monthly household expenditures, and to the fact that uncertainty in these expen-
ditures appears to play a significant role. I explain in detail how the data analysis is performed,
and show its robustness to assumptions that I make along the way.
Next, I develop a dynamic stochastic partial-equilibrium model of household portfolio choice,
in order to study the hypothesis rigorously, both analytically and quantitatively. The basis is
a standard incomplete-market heterogeneous-agent model with two types of idiosyncratic risk.
The model’s novel features are a two-market structure, where in one of the markets credit cannot
be used, and the timing of the two risk realizations during the period such that portfolio decisions
have to be made before spending decisions. In its treatment of money, the model is consistent
both with Lucas-Stokey-style cash-credit good models and with a more recent generation of
monetary models that treat the reasons for why money is essential in trade explicitly.3 As I
3In a related theoretical exercise, Telyukova and Wright (2008) approach this puzzle as the rate-of-return
dominance puzzle and develop a micro-founded monetary model to analyze it. In that paper, the model we
develop treats explicitly, in an analytically tractable way, the frictions that are needed to make both money and
credit essential in an economy. In the current paper, in contrast, my focus is on quantitative analysis using a
heterogeneous-agent model that is not analytically tractable - so I abstract from the reasons for why credit may
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will show, the model has all the analytical implications important for addressing the credit card
debt puzzle.
I calibrate the model by matching it to properties of liquid-asset consumption and main
distributional characteristics in the data. It is crucial that I leave all properties of household
portfolio choice, as well as the numbers of people who choose different portfolios, untargeted
in the calibration, in order to be able to judge in a disciplined way how well the hypothesis
presented here does at explaining the puzzle. The calibration method is based on the simulated
method of moments, where I minimize the weighted squared distance between relevant moments
in the data and their simulated counterparts in the model. The calibrated model accounts for
between 85 and 104% of the households who choose to revolve debt while holding money in
the bank, and for a median such household, for 56-62 cents of every dollar it holds in liquid
accounts. The ranges are given for two alternative calibrations, depending on the choice of the
risk aversion parameter.
The main contributions of this paper are four. First, I carefully evaluate for the first time an
intuitive answer to a standing puzzle, and find that it can account for the puzzle to a considerable
degree. Debt puzzles of this nature have led the literature to challenge the standard consumption
and saving models as incapable of explaining them. This paper can be seen partly as a response
to this challenge. This does not mean that the alternative explanations involving opportunistic
bankruptcy behavior or self-control considerations play no role, but I do find that a model that
abstracts from such considerations goes a long way toward matching the facts. Second, the need
for liquidity arises in this paper because liquid assets are the most versatile and sometimes the
unique payment option available. This mechanism then accounts for a much broader class of debt
puzzles than just the one having to do with credit card debt. The co-existence of any kind of debt
and liquid assets in a household portfolio could have the same explanation as the one presented
here, and the model may be useful in accounting for such portfolio allocation puzzles. Third, this
paper is the first, to my knowledge, to measure a new type of idiosyncratic risk - namely, expense
risk that leads to precautionary liquidity demand. In light of the interest of the incomplete-
market literature on idiosyncratic risk, this is an important step toward understanding the types
of risk that households face. Fourth, in the process, I obtain new estimates of some parameters
be accepted in some markets, but not others, and simply take this fact as given.
5
of general interest - especially the elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods -
that have only been estimated in deterministic representative-agent models until now. My
estimates suggest that idiosyncratic uncertainty affects these parameter estimates considerably.
My estimate of the elasticity of substitution is significantly lower than what was previously
obtained; my conclusion is that cash and credit goods tend to be complements rather than
substitutes. This finding, explained in detail, is based on direct measurement in micro data of
cash-good consumption, which has not been done previously, and the intuition for the result is
clear-cut in the model.
In complimentary work, Zinman(2006) uses survey data to demonstrate also, via some data
calculations, that “borrowing high and lending low” is largely not puzzling and could be accom-
modated within the standard theoretical framework. His claim is that once one accounts for
the liquidity premium of checking and savings accounts, the return differential between the two
assets is largely calculated away, and the puzzle stops being prevalent. Thus, Zinman’s findings
provide informal support for the formal treatment of the liquidity need hypothesis presented in
this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I characterize the credit card debt puzzle
in the data, by studying the Survey of Consumer Finances and Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Section 3 lays out the model and analyzes its properties. Section 4 discusses computation, and
section 5 presents detailed information on the calibration strategy. Section 6 presents the results
from the calibrated model, and section 7 discusses them. Section 8 concludes. Some details of
the data are relegated to the appendix.
2 Data
I use two U.S. household surveys in order to describe the puzzle in the data. One data source
is the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a triennial cross-sectional survey that has detailed
information on household assets and liabilities. In particular, it measures carefully both house-
hold liquid asset holdings and revolving credit card debt, and despite its cross-sectional nature,
allows to assert persistence of this debt. I am able to observe when balances are rolled over
(distinguishing them from new purchases on the credit card), how large they are, and how often
the household repays its balance in full. To define the puzzle group, as described below, I take
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only the households that revolve debt habitually, that is, report repaying their balance off in full
only sometimes or never. I am able to measure credit card debt precisely as well: I include only
the amount of the balance due on the credit card left over after the last statement was paid -
thus excluding, for example, recent purchases, or balances that were paid off. See appendix A.2
for more details on the subgroup selection.
The definition of liquid assets used in this paper includes checking accounts, savings accounts,
and brokerage accounts (idle money in a brokerage house that is not being invested in stocks).
This definition is motivated by what can be observed in the surveys. In particular, no data are
collected on household cash holdings. I do not anticipate this to be a big problem, however:
for the purpose of monthly transactions and larger purchases that I consider here, people are
not likely to hold their liquidity in cash form, using their bank account actively instead to hold
and transact with liquid assets via the use of checks, for example. The only households that
are likely to be significantly affected by this data restriction are those in the borrower category,
some of whom may not have bank accounts and are thus likely to be forced to hold cash. This,
however, is not likely to impact my calculations regarding the puzzle itself, and may only bias
the results slightly against me, in that some of the households I observe as borrowers may, in
fact, have both debt and liquid assets that I cannot observe.
I use the 2001 wave of the SCF in this analysis. I separate the SCF sample into three
subgroups: those who have sizeable revolving credit card debt and no significant liquid assets
(“borrowers”), those who have both in significant amounts (“borrowers and savers”, i.e. the
puzzle group), and those who have liquid assets but no revolving credit card debt (“savers”).
Notice that the borrowing behavior here is defined solely by credit cards, and saving solely by
liquid assets - which include checking, savings and brokerage accounts. I abstract, in choosing the
terminology and focus, from the fact that these households may be, and usually are, borrowing
or saving in other assets.
In addition, I use the 2000-2002 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to study consumption
patterns of the households who revolved credit card debt in 2001, to match the SCF timeline.
This survey is a rotating panel, where each household is interviewed for five consecutive quar-
ters, four of which (second through fifth) are available in the public data set. The advantage of
the survey is detailed measurement of all aspects of household monthly consumption: in each
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interview, the household is asked to recall all of its expenditures in the preceding three months.4
Although it is less careful about measuring assets and credit card debt, there is enough informa-
tion to subdivide this population into the same subgroups as in the SCF. I study the properties
of household consumption in goods paid by liquid assets versus other methods.
In both surveys, I consider those who hold more than $500 in revolving credit card debt and
more than $500 in liquid assets as the borrower-and-saver group.5 I study all households with
heads of age 25 to 64; thus, I exclude college students and retirees, whose saving and borrowing
behavior may differ from the rest of the population (for example, borrowing behavior among
college students may be hard to analyze, since their debts are often repaid by their parents, as
is well documented). Additional details of the surveys, the sample selection process, and the
puzzle measurement methods are described in the data appendices A.1 and A.2.
Tables 1 through 4 describe the credit card debt puzzle, and compare the households in the
puzzle group to the rest of the population. I show that these households appear to have the
same demographic characteristics as everyone else, and they lie in the middle of the economic
distribution. I also present evidence that the need for liquidity may be a good candidate for
explaining the puzzle, because the liquid assets that these households have do not seem unrea-
sonably large in amount relative to their income, spending and credit card debt. Tables 5, 6, 7
and 8 then characterize in more detail household liquid asset holdings and their use, in order to
show, in support of the central hypothesis here, that liquid assets do appear to have a significant
and unique role in household finances that cannot be replaced by other instruments.
2.1 Demographic and Asset Data
Table 1 gives the size of the credit card debt puzzle in the data. I present the measurements
from both data sets, to demonstrate that they are close. Judging by descriptive statistics of
both groups (not presented here for the CEX), it is apparent that these groups are comparable
in the two surveys, so that analyzing their consumption in the CEX and assets in the SCF is a
4To be precise, 65% of the expenditure data are collected via direct questions about the month and amount
of expenditure, while 35% of the expenditures are measured via questions on quarterly spending, which is then
divided into three average-monthly amounts. The latter procedure applies to food, for example. This procedure
will make observed volatility of consumption of such goods appear smaller than it may be in reality, thus making
the measurements I use err on the conservative side.
5I choose the $500 threshold mainly to follow other literature on this subject. Having studied alternatives, I
came to the conclusion that the puzzle measured in different ways is still a significant one in the U.S., while the
subgroups’ characteristics remain stable regardless of the specification.
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Table 1: The Credit Card Debt Puzzle in 2001
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
Puzzle size: Percent distribution
SCF 5% 27% 68%
CEX 7% 29% 64%
Interest rates:
Credit cards 14.8% 13.7% 9.8%
Checking accounts (avg. across groups) 0.7%
Savings accounts (avg. across groups) 1.2%
Notes: “Borrow” refers to revolving debt on credit cards; “save” to saving in liquid
assets. Credit cards are bank-type and store cards that allow revolving debt. Liquid
assets are checking, savings, and brokerage accounts. Interest rates on checking and
savings accounts are from a survey by bankrate.com, and represent national averages
for the entire population. Credit card interest rates are from the SCF question
“What is the interest rate you pay on the credit card with the highest balance?” For
the puzzle group (“borrow & save”) measurement, I take everyone with liquid asset
holdings above $500, and credit card debt above $500.
valid exercise. Around 27% to 29% of the U.S. population were simultaneously borrowing and
saving in 2001. Only between 5 and 7% of the population are credit card borrowers with little
or no observed liquid assets, and the rest have no significant credit card debt. Notice that these
numbers imply that of all habitual credit card debt revolvers, 80 to 84% have some liquid assets
that they could in principle use to pay down their debt! The last three rows of the table give
average interest rates that households report paying on their credit card debt versus national
interest average rates on checking and savings accounts.6 It is clear that there is a significant
difference in the rates, which gives the appearance of a violation of the standard no-arbitrage
condition, and which originally gave rise to the term “credit card debt puzzle”.
Table 2 breaks down some of the demographic characteristics of the subgroups from the SCF;
the numbers are nearly replicated in the CEX, and not presented here. Each cell of the table
shows a percentage of the subgroup that has the characteristic. For example, the first line shows
that 70% of the borrower group, 74% of the saver group, and 78% of the puzzle group are white.
Comparing the numbers for different characteristics to the overall sample average shown in the
6Very few of these households report paying “teaser” zero interest rates on the accounts on which they are
revolving balances.
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Table 2: Demographics
Borrow Borrow Save Share in
& Save Population
% of subgroup with characteristic
Race: white 0.70 0.78 0.74 0.75
Marital status: married 0.48 0.62 0.58 0.59
Have dependent children 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.40
Head works full-time 0.76 0.85 0.80 0.81
Head white-collar/prof. 0.48 0.61 0.58 0.58
Education: less than HS 0.13 0.05 0.13 0.11
HS/some college 0.73 0.61 0.51 0.55
College degree or more 0.14 0.33 0.36 0.34
Source: 2001 SCF. Weighted averages within subgroups.
right column, we see that none of them seem particularly pronounced for the borrower-and-saver
group. The borrower-and-saver group is skewed slightly toward white households (78% versus
75% overall average), toward married households (62% versus 59%), toward heads employed full-
time (84% versus 81%) and in white collar occupations (61% versus 58%) - perhaps contrary to
what we might expect. The share of households in this group with dependent children is on par
with the overall average. They also tend to be slightly better educated: the group has the fewest
households with education of less than high school (5% versus 11%), while the share of those
with a college degree or above is the same as it is nationally. The saver group compares similarly
to national averages, while the borrower group is the one that is least educated, comprises most
unmarried households, and is skewed most toward nonwhite households. The main idea here
is to show that there is nothing inherent in demographic or “socioeconomic” terms about the
borrowing and saving group that might lead them to behave differently from others.7
Table 3 presents income and asset information for each subgroup. The puzzle group clearly
lies in the middle of the economic distribution. Their mean total after-tax annual income
is $52,114, as compared to $64,331 for the saver group, and $28,032 for the borrower group.
They hold, on average, about 1.7 times their monthly income in liquid assets (and only 0.8 in
the median), as compared to the liquidity holdings of the savers of 2.5 times monthly income
7This is confirmed in formal probit analysis, not presented here.
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Table 3: Income and Asset Holding
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
U.S. Dollars
Credit card debt: Mean 5,172 5,766 317
Median 3,340 3,800 0
Liquid assets: Mean 227 7,237 17,386
Median 200 3,000 3,200
Total after-tax income: Mean 28,032 52,114 64,331
Median 25,350 43,600 39,950
Other financial assets: Mean 4,424 40,545 102,558
Median 0 4,400 4,100
Net wealth: Mean 36,231 187,508 466,462
Median 9,450 84,640 104,500
Liquid assets as share of Mean 0.12 1.71 2.53
monthly after-tax income Median 0.10 0.79 0.88
Source: 2001 SCF. “Other financial assets” include IRA’s, mutual funds, bond
and equity holdings, annuities, life insurance. Net wealth is all assets, financial
and non-financial, net of liabilities; it is computed by the author in the SCF.
(and equal to it in the median).8 Several further insights are important. First, while liquidity
holdings of the borrower-and-saver group are not negligible, at $3,000 in the median, they are
not unreasonable either, relative to their income. Secondly, these households have significant
amounts of nonliquid financial assets as well, so there is no evidence that they are unaware of
more lucrative saving opportunities. These facts suggest that the liquidity holdings of these
households may, in fact, be geared toward some well thought-out purpose in any given month.
Compare this to the savers, who evidently have enough liquidity both to cover their credit card
expenses, so they need not revolve debt (the majority of them do have and use credit cards),
and to cover any monthly liquid expenditure needs as well. Insofar as we may think of the savers
as the least constrained group - i.e. most able to achieve their first-best allocation - these data
suggest that the borrower-and-saver group might like to hold even more liquidity than they are
8A concern may arise that these numbers could be collected at the beginning of the month, say, when the
paycheck has just arrived into the account. As per the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, which collects the
data, SCF interviews are conducted throughout the month, and these asset numbers, averaged across households,
thus represent a monthly average on the account. The Federal Reserve Board declined to release interview dates.
Thus, I will treat liquidity measurements as monthly averages, and will carefully treat liquidity in the model to
match the same average concept.
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Table 4: Home Ownership by Subgroup
Borrow Borrow Save Share in
& Save Population
% of subgroup with characteristic
Own house with mortgage 0.41 0.59 0.47 0.50
Own house without mortgage 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.12
Rent 0.40 0.23 0.28 0.28
Source: 2001 SCF. Totals do not add up to one because some categories (such as town-
house/condo association) are excluded.
able to.
In addition, the presence of significant nonliquid financial assets in all but the borrowers’ port-
folios, as well as a look at the net worth of these households, suggest that strategic bankruptcy
behavior, as per Lehnert and Maki (2001), is highly unlikely for at least the majority of the
puzzle households. Finally, note that on average, the amount of debt these households have is
approximately equal (higher in the median, at $3,800, but lower in the mean) to their liquid
holdings; if they were to use their liquidity to pay off debt, they would be left with little or no
money in the bank in most cases.
Table 4 presents a further aspect of household asset holdings: homeowners (especially those
who pay mortgage) are more likely to be in the puzzle subgroup. They are overrepresented in
this group compared to the overall average: homeowners with mortgage constitute 59% of this
group, relative to only 50% of the population.
The evidence presented so far would suggest that there is no apparent reason to assume any-
thing different about the preferences of these households, and it seems likely that the motivation
for this observed behavior is economic in nature. Moreover, households appear to diversify their
portfolios, as they tend to have investments in real estate and significant holdings of nonliquid
financial assets. In other words, it appears that the liquid holdings that households have may
be designated for a specific purpose which may have priority over credit card repayment up to
a certain level of liquid assets. Those households that are not overly cash-rich (see table 3) may
have liquid assets under that level, so it may be optimal for them to delay debt repayment in
favor of keeping the liquid assets available in the bank. In addition, as discussed, homeowners
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Table 5: Aggregate Consumer Transactions, Shares by Method of Payment
Transaction number Transaction volume
1999 2000 2002 1990 1999 2000 2002
Liquid 78.2 77.8 76.7 81.2 70.3 68.8 64.9
Checks 27.9 26.9 24.4 61.3 46.2 43.9 39.0
Cash 44.2 43.5 41.3 19.6 19.4 18.9 19.5
Debit 6.1 7.4 11.0 0.3 4.7 6.0 8.4
Electronic 1.5 1.8 2.4 0.7 3.4 4.2 5.6
Credit Cards 17.4 17.7 17.6 14.5 22.5 23.9 24.0
Source: Statistical Abstract of the U.S. 2003
are more likely to be in the puzzle group than non-homeowners. This makes sense once we
consider that the expenditures for which credit is not accepted in payment have most to do with
home ownership - examples are mortgage payments and especially household operations and
repairs, for which the owner of the house, rather than a renter, would be responsible, and which
also are often unexpected and large in magnitude. The next three tables demonstrate in more
detail that liquid assets appear to have an important autonomous role in household finances that
cannot be replaced by other assets, which would support the hypothesis under investigation.
In aggregate, it is clear that liquid assets have retained an obviously dominant role in con-
sumer transactions, even though credit card usage has been growing somewhat. Table 5 gives
aggregate consumer transactions by payment method for selected years from 1990 to 2002. In
2002, liquid payment methods, such as cash, checks, and debit cards, accounted for 77% of total
consumer transactions, or 65% of their total value. If we include electronic payments in this
category, since they are most often backed by a checking account directly, the numbers go up to
79% and 71%, respectively. In contrast, credit cards accounted for only 24% of the value of all
consumer purchases in 2002.
2.2 Consumption Data
I turn to the CEX to study household liquid asset holdings relative to their consumption patterns
in goods that require the use of liquid assets. I will also use these data to study volatility of
liquid consumption. The first step is to separate out the group of goods that can legitimately be
viewed as payable by liquid assets. There are data limitations, so that this measurement cannot
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be perfect; I limit the measurement procedure along several dimensions, in order to achieve as
careful and as conservative a measure as I can. Although survey data on consumer payment
method choice are scant, one such survey was conducted in 2004 by the American Bankers
Association. In it, consumers were asked questions about their perceptions and usage of payment
methods; in particular, they were asked how they normally pay at different types of stores and
for different types of bills. I present the details of the 2004 wave of this survey in appendix A.3.
Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 summarize the relevant information. It is clear from the survey that liquid
payment methods dominate household expenditures. Consumers overwhelmingly pay all house-
related types of bills that are asked about in the survey, such as rents, mortgages, insurance, and
utilities, by check or related liquid instruments (e.g. direct debit from the account). They also
tend to pay for child care and tuition with liquid instruments, but I do not include intermittent
expenses such as tuition in the cash-only group, as they are likely to skew upwards the perception
of volatility. Payments for home repairs are not asked about in the survey; however, in the SCF,
households name emergencies as their number two reason for saving, preceded only by asset
investment for retirement.9 While we see evidence that they save for retirement in retirement
accounts, emergencies, including home-related ones, by their definition are likely to require
liquid savings. In terms of payment methods in stores, the evidence suggests that while credit
cards are predominant in department stores, gas stations and convenience stores, liquid payment
methods dominate in supermarkets, drug stores, restaurants and transit systems. Backed by this
information, I choose the group of cash-only goods that consists of rents, mortgages, utilities,
repairs, household operations, property taxes, insurance, public transportation, health insurance,
and also food, alcohol and tobacco. For most of these goods, it is largely a requirement that
a liquid payment method be used. This is not true for food, alcohol and tobacco; we see that
consumers do pay for them predominantly in liquid instruments, but they frequently are likely
to have the option to use a credit card as well. The reason to include these goods is that they
appear to be predominantly cash-only goods in the data. Why that is is a question outside of
the scope of this paper, and is the subject of a separate payments studies literature. This issue
is discussed in more detail in the appendix. I will show the sensitivity of some calculations to
the inclusion and exclusion of these goods below. In any event, food, alcohol and tobacco are a
9The question reads “What are your most important reasons for saving?” Respondents get to choose as many
as they want in the order of declining importance.
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Table 6: Household Liquidity Holding and Consumption Patterns
Borrow Borrow Save
& Save
U.S. Dollars
Liquid assets: Mean 227 7,338 17,435
Median 200 3,000 3,200
Monthly cash-only good cons: Mean 1,561 2,106 1,665
Median 1,369 1,890 1,433
Liquid assets/cons: Mean 0.1 3.4 10.0
Median 0.1 1.5 2.0
Source: SCF, CEX. Household levels, weighted averages.
minority of the cash-only expenditure category.
More generally, the cash good group selection may be seen as conservative. No durable
or semi-durable goods, such as appliance purchases or even clothing purchases, are included.
Thus, for example, the cash-good category excludes many situations that may be reflections of
emergencies that require liquid payment - such as an emergency purchase of (or downpayment
on) a durable to replace - rather than repair - a broken durable, such as a car or an appliance.
Similarly, medical payments, which include co-pays or other out-of-pocket expenses, some of
which are unpredictable and may require a liquid payment - are not included either; the decision
here was driven by the fact that medical expenses may be payable by credit card. Instead, many
of the categories that are included - such as food, insurance premia, etc., are paid on monthly
basis and are predictable. Thus, in measuring the volatility of cash-good consumption, using
a lot of the “smooth” good categories, while excluding many that may reflect other types of
emergencies besides repairs, will tend to understate my measurements of the uncertainty that
households face, against which they may hold liquid assets. However, to convince the reader
of the fact that the approach is conservative, the analysis below, as pertaining to volatility of
liquid consumption, describes robustness checks on the cash-good measurement.
Table 6 presents household liquid asset holdings relative to average monthly consumption
of cash-only goods. In the borrower-and-saver group, the median household has 1.5 times its
average monthly liquid consumption in the bank accounts, while the mean household has 3.4
times the amount. Again, these are numbers that are significant but seemingly not unreasonable.
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Table 7: Unpredictable Volatility of Average Household Cash-Good Consumption, Monthly
Data
Borrow Borrow Save All
& Save
Avg. cond’l st. dev.(%)
Liquid consumption (residual), εit
Benchmark 22.8 23.5 24.5 24.1
Excluding food 27.7 27.9 30.1 29.2
Excluding food and property taxes 29.8 30.7 32.8 32.0
Unpredictable liquid consumption, ηit
Benchmark 21.7 23.0 23.8 23.5
Excluding food 26.8 27.5 29.4 28.7
Excluding food and property taxes 29.0 30.1 32.2 31.4
Source: CEX. Conditional standard deviation: population average of
household-level conditional standard deviation of month-to-month liquid con-
sumption, taken across a 12-month period in which the household appears in
the survey. Measured by regressing log liquid household consumption on a set
of month and year dummies, household observables, and household fixed effect,
in a model with AR(1) disturbances. The residual is taken as the idiosyncratic
component of consumption. Percent measure: st.dev. of the log-residual mul-
tiplied by 100. Benchmark: see appendix in paper.
Compare these with the holdings of the saver group, who have on average 10 times their mean
monthly liquid spending, or twice the monthly spending amount in the median. Again we see
that the savers are better equipped to handle both their liquid spending needs and credit card
bills, rather than having to prioritize one over the other due to scarce liquid resources.
The evidence in table 6 points to precautionary demand for money: households have liquid
asset amounts that are in excess of what they spend on average per month, and those who
are sufficiently well-off are holding much more liquidity than those in the middle, suggesting
that richer households choose to buffer themselves more fully, and that some households become
constrained from doing so completely, which may lead to borrowing-and-saving behavior on their
part.
I now turn to characterizing a cause of this precautionary behavior. I study volatility of
liquid consumption in order to gauge whether there is evidence in the data of uncertainty that
households hedge against specifically with liquid assets. There are several issues that arise in
constructing this measure of volatility. First, measuring raw volatility of consumption may not
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be fully informative about unpredictable volatility, since it may also reflect seasonal volatility,
for example, as well as other factors that may be predictable to the household. Second, users
of the CEX data frequently use quarterly averages of consumption rather than the monthly
measure because some questions are asked only as averages over three months, as mentioned
before. To answer in part the first concern, I exclude from the expenditures all purchases made
as gifts; this information is explicitly collected in the CEX for each purchase reported. This
should help remove some of the seasonality in the consumption series, since much of seasonal
purchasing is done in holiday gifts. In addition, following literature on idiosyncratic income
and consumption uncertainty (see, e.g., Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron 2004b), I filter out the
predictable component of expenditures, by estimating the following model:10
log(cliqit ) = βXit + ui + εit (1)
εit = ρεi,t−1 + ηit.
This is a fixed-effects model with AR(1) innovations. The vector X includes, depending on spec-
ification, household observables, such as age (a cubic), education, marital status, race, earnings,
family size, homeownership status, as well as seasonal effects (a set of month and year dummies).
Several specifications including different sets of these observables all produced nearly identical
results. ui is the household fixed effect. The residual εit is the idiosyncratic component of liquid
consumption, and it further consists of a persistent component and a transitory component (this
becomes relevant later when I model the shock as having a possible persistent component). The
results for volatility of consumption below present standard deviation of the total residual εit.
I show, further, that even when the persistent component is taken out, the volatility of the
residual ηit remains strong.
Table 7, rows 1 and 4, show volatility of consumption, by household subgroup, in the cash-
only good category, measured as average monthly standard deviation of the residuals ε and η,
multiplied by 100 to convert it to percent terms. First, volatility is fairly large, ranging between
22.8 and 24.5 % for the total residual measure, and 21.7-23.8% for the non-persistent component.
10One important distinction, of course, between measuring income versus consumption uncertainty is that the
measures of income volatility are often translated directly into measures of income shocks, while consumption
volatility reflects only the endogenous response of the household to its idiosyncratic shocks, which may, in fact,
be larger than the response. E.g. after a car breakdown, one may choose to make fewer repairs than would
be necessary to bring the car back to the previous condition, to conserve the expense. This mapping between
volatility and uncertainty will be discussed further in the Calibration section.
17
Volatility is slightly higher for savers, and lowest for borrowers, which may reflect differing
ability of these groups, given their asset positions, to insure against shocks in consumption.
Again, housing-related expenditures constitute the bulk of the cash-only good group and a
sizeable portion of them is likely to be unpredictable. Indeed, expenses that pertain to home
maintenance tend to be the most volatile in my data, while expenses such as food are the
least volatile. The volatility we observe in cash-only good consumption may be a reflection
of unexpected, and possibly large, spending shocks; households try to insure against them by
holding extra liquidity in the bank.
Concerns may arise that even controlling for household observables, the nature of expenses
may be such that it adds “lumpiness”, which looks like volatile consumption, to the extent that
they are on goods that are durable or semi-durable, or goods that are neither, but perfectly
predictable and consumed at a lower frequency than monthly. With respect to the first, I
emphasize that I remove all durable and semi-durable goods from the cash good category -
appliances, furniture, cars, houses, and even apparel, are not included here. With respect to
the latter, one example that commonly comes up is property taxes or auto insurance, which -
unlike other predictable liquid expenses such as rent or mortgage - are often paid on less frequent
basis. The evidence on this is mixed - some households choose to pay these on monthly basis
too, as options for “financing” auto insurance, for example, are available. However, to check
the robustness of my measures to various assumptions regarding specific goods, I have looked at
many different permutations of cash-good group measurements, taking out from the benchmark
measure described above food/alcohol/tobacco, insurance payments, property tax payments,
and other predictable expenses. I present results for three such permutations: in addition to the
benchmark group in the top row, I also present (a) the benchmark minus food/alcohol/tobacco,
and (b) group (a) minus, in addition, property taxes. As is evident, the more I exclude such
predictable expenses, the more volatility of the remaining group increases. This suggests that
the goods that may be paid infrequently do not seem to take away from volatility - at least,
the evidence is consistently suggesting that the benchmark cash-good category gives by far the
most dampened measure of consumption volatility. This is the group that I will use in further
analysis, in an attempt to stay conservative in the measurements.
Finally, to answer the concern that the CEX may be more suitable for analysis of quarterly
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Table 8: Unpredictable Volatility of Average Household Cash-Good Consumption, Quarterly
Data
Borrow Borrow Save All
& Save
Avg. cond’l st. dev.(%)
Liquid consumption (residual), εit
Benchmark 20.5 18.4 20.1 19.6
Excluding food 28.0 24.7 29.0 27.7
Excluding food and property taxes 29.0 26.7 30.8 29.6
Unpredictable liquid consumption, ηit
Benchmark 20.5 18.4 20.0 19.6
Excluding food 27.6 24.5 28.8 27.5
Excluding food and property taxes 28.6 26.5 30.7 29.4
data, I also present the same table (table 8) for quarterly consumption. What becomes difficult
here is that now I only have 3 observations per household, so there may be some noise in the
measurements - this is evident, in particular, in that we lose the monotonic relationship between
consumption volatility and subgroup (now borrowers have higher volatility than borrower-savers,
which may simply reflect the relatively small sample size of borrowers with only 3 data points
per household). However, this exercise reassures that the measures of volatility of consumption
based on monthly data are robust. They decrease a little on quarterly basis, as would be
expected given that we are now aggregating monthly measures into smoother quarterly ones,
but the decrease is small.
To sum up, data suggest that the credit card debt puzzle is significant in magnitude, but it
appears that tying it to liquidity demand - both for transactions purposes and for precautionary
reasons - is reasonable and may account for some of the puzzle. There are situations where
liquidity is a non-substitutable resource, and the resulting demand for liquidity may be significant
enough to account for households who choose to hold on to their liquid assets instead of paying
down credit card debt. The rest of the paper is devoted to evaluating formally whether this
hypothesis can account for the data. First, I lay down a model that can address this question
in a disciplined way. Then, I calibrate this model and use it to measure the ability of the need
for liquidity to account for the credit card debt puzzle.
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3 Model
Time is discrete. There is a [0,1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents. Each period is divided into
two subperiods that differ by their market arrangements. There are two consumption goods:
one consumed in subperiod 1, the other in subperiod 2. There are also two instruments available
to agents in each period. One is money, denoted mjt - a storable, perfectly divisible, intrinsically
worthless object, potentially useful only as a medium of exchange. This instrument represents
all liquid assets, including checks and debit cards. Its essential feature is that it is an instant
form of payment, rather than a form of credit. The subscript j stands for the subperiod, while t
is for the period. The other instrument is a noncontingent bond, bjt, borrowing through which
at a rate rt captures consumer credit (which can be interpreted as a credit card in the current
context); saving in it is also allowed.
In the goods market in the first subperiod, either money or credit can be used in trade.
In contrast, during the second subperiod, consumer credit is not allowed in trade.11 In both
subperiods, there are competitive firms producing the consumption good in the background.
In the first subperiod, they take labor supplied by households as input, while in the second,
households do not provide any inputs into production, and simply buy consumption goods
from the firms at prices they take parametrically. Although markets are competitive, they are
incomplete: insurance markets are closed during both subperiods.
During each period, households are subject to idiosyncratic income and preference uncer-
tainty. There is no aggregate uncertainty. The shocks on income and preferences do not realize
simultaneously: income shocks realize at the beginning of the first subperiod, while preference
shocks realize at the beginning of the second. Since there are no insurance markets for these
shocks, the only way to insure is by accumulating one or both of the assets m and b.
At the beginning of the first subperiod, the household’s income shock st realizes. Agents then
supply labor inelastically (that is, there is no labor choice) and earn their income, consume with
either credit or money, and allocate their resources between the two instruments in a household
11The question of why credit cannot be used is beyond the scope of this paper, as it is a question of understanding
the supply side of consumer credit. There are several approaches to it in the macro literature in similar contexts:
one is to assume spatial separation between the earner and the shopper, as in Stokey-Lucas-style cash-credit
good models; another is to assume that agents are anonymous, as in money search models following Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989). See Telyukova and Wright (2008) for a related model of money and credit that addresses the issue
in more detail in a similar context.
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portfolio. Let us assume that st ∈ S is a discrete Markov process, with S = {s, s2, ..., s¯}, s > 0.
The transition matrix is given by Γ(st, st+1), with each entry denoting probability of entering
state st+1 given that the currently realized state is st.
At the start of the second subperiod, the consumer’s preference shock zt realizes, also assumed
to be a discrete Markov process with z ∈ Z = {z, z2, ..., z¯}, and transition matrix Π(zt, zt+1).
Note that the shocks on income and preferences, and their transitions, are assumed to be inde-
pendent of each other. After the realization of z, the subperiod’s market opens. Here, households
choose consumption conditional on their preference shock realization, but it is crucial to note
that they cannot produce or borrow in this market, so they do not have access to additional
income when they need to consume. Note that the sequential timing structure in this model is
not crucial for the results. The model could have the two markets co-existing in time, for exam-
ple; the important feature is only that a household makes its portfolio decisions for the entire
period in the beginning of it - which is realistic, given that liquid spending opportunities can
arrive continually and randomly throughout the month and until its very end, while additional
income does not.
In each subperiod, the household’s state variables are its current knowledge of the idiosyn-
cratic shock processes s and z, and its current portfolio (m, b). Since the income shock st realizes
at the beginning of the first subperiod, while the preference shock zt does not realize until the
second, in the first subperiod the state is (st, zt−1,m1t, b1t). Correspondingly, the state in the
second subperiod is (st, zt,m2t, b2t). Agents take prices as given, so prices, or alternatively the
distribution of agents, are aggregate state variables, which I make implicit in the notation.
Lifetime utility is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt[u1(c1t) + ztu2(c2t)],
where it is assumed that ∀ j = {1, 2}, where j denotes the subperiod, uj ∈ C
3, u′j(·) > 0,
u′′j (·) < 0, u
′′′
j (·) > 0 and the functions satisfy Inada conditions, limcjt→0 u
′
j(cjt) = ∞ and
limcjt→∞ u
′
j(cjt) = 0. I assume that the preference shock is multiplicative on the utility of con-
sumption in the second subperiod. Note that in this formulation of the problem, the utility
function is assumed to be separable in first- and second-subperiod consumption. This is not
necessary for any of the results that I want to emphasize, but does make analysis more trans-
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parent. For computation, I will make the utility function nonseparable, as it is more realistic
from the data point of view, and adds interesting empirical insights.12
I formulate the household problem recursively.13 The nature of the question makes it suf-
ficient to study the partial equilibrium of this problem: that is, I will set prices exogenously
and study the resulting decision rules. In the first subperiod, a household solves the following
problem:
V1(st, zt−1,m1t, b1t) = max
c1t,m2t,b2t
u1(c1t) + Ezt|zt−1V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t) (2)
s.t. c1t + φ1tm2t = st + φ1tm1t + b2t − b1t(1 + rt)
b2t ≤ B¯
c1t ≥ 0,m2t ≥ 0
Here, φ1t is the real value of money, that is, the inverse of the price on the consumption good.
rt is the interest rate that is charged on debt at the beginning of subperiod 1. I assume, as is
necessary for existence of a stationary equilibrium, that β < 1/(1+ rt)∀ t (Aiyagari, 1994). The
expectation term is written conditional on only the previous realization of the shock, reflecting
the assumption above that the shock has a Markov form. The second constraint imposes a
credit limit on the household, here taken to be exogenous. Notice that there is no nonnegativity
constraint on debt: agents can save in b2t.
14
In the second subperiod, households solve the following problem, once the preference shock
realizes:
V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t) = max
c2t
ztu2(c2t) + βEst+1|stV1(st+1, zt,m1,t+1, b1,t+1) (3)
s.t. c2t ≤ φ2tm2t
m1,t+1 = m2t −
c2t
φ2t
b1,t+1 = b2t
12The analytical results I emphasize here do not hinge in any way on the separability assumption - all the
results would go through even in the non-separable utility case. On the other hand, empirically, the interaction
of the two consumption goods may play a part in the magnitude of the results, and it seems natural to expect
that it is non-trivial in reality; I will take up this issue in the computational part of the paper.
13The Principle of Optimality applies here as is standard. In addition, existence and uniqueness are guaranteed
as long as standard assumptions are made on the utility function and the constraint space to make the problem
bounded.
14In computation, I will allow for an interest spread: interest rate on borrowing, b2t > 0, will be higher than
that on saving, b2t < 0. This does not change the nature of the problem, but would require additional notation.
In the analytical discussion, I abstract from this.
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φ2t again denotes the subperiod’s real value of money. Notice from the third equality that no
interest on consumer debt is accumulated in the second subperiod - this captures the grace
period typical of a credit card billing cycle. Note also that in this subperiod, no portfolio
rebalancing can take place if a household experiences a low shock and has money left over at the
end of the period. This restriction is meant to capture the continual nature of the unpredictable
expenses in the data: since in reality, expense shocks could hit continually throughout the month,
experiencing a low expense shock at any point during the month would not cause the household
to spend the remainder of its precautionary liquid balances to pay off debt before the month is
over.
Because in this problem the timing of the decisions between the two subperiods affects
the state variables on which these decisions depend, it helps to keep track of the states ex-
plicitly while discussing the solution. Denote the state variables of the first subperiod as
x1t = (st, zt−1,m1t, b1t). Then, the decision rules from the first-subperiod problem are c1t(x1t),
m2t(x1t), and b2t(x1t). In addition, let λ(x1t) be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
credit constraint. The first-order conditions that characterize the solution to this problem are,
∀x1t:
− u′1(c1t(x1t))φ1t + Ezt|zt−1V2m(st, zt,m2t(x1t), b2t(x1t)) = 0 (4)
u′1(c1t(x1t)) + Ezt|zt−1V2b(st, zt,m2t(x1t), b2t(x1t))− λ(x1t) = 0 (5)
The envelope conditions of the first subperiod are:
V1m(x1t) = φ1tu
′
1(c1t(x1t)) (6)
V1b(x1t) = −(1 + rt)u
′
1(c1t(x1t)) (7)
Denote by x2t = (st, zt,m2t, b2t) the state of the agent in subperiod 2; note again that it is
different from the state in subperiod 1. Then the decision rule of this subperiod is c2t(x2t), and
I denote the Lagrange multiplier on the money constraint µ(x2t). The first-order condition of
this problem is:
ztu
′
2(c2t(x2t))− µ(x2t)−
β
φ2t
Est+1|stV1m(st+1, zt,m2t −
c2t(x2t)
φ2t
, b2t) = 0. (8)
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The envelope conditions are, after substituting in (6) and (7),
V2m(x2t) = βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)) + φ2tµ(x2t) (9)
V2b(x2t) = −βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)). (10)
Combining the first-order conditions with the envelope conditions, we get the following char-
acterization. In any equilibrium, the solution to the household problem in this economy (a partial
equilibrium) is given by the set of decision rules {c1t(x1t),m2t(x1t), b2t(x1t), c2t(x2t)} that satisfy
the following Euler equations (along with the budget constraint and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
for the multipliers), ∀x1t, x2t:
φ1tu
′
1(c1t(x1t)) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)) + φ2tµ(x2t)} (11)
u′1(c1t(x1t))− λ(x1t) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1))} (12)
ztu
′
2(c2t(x2t)) = βEst+1|st
φ1,t+1
φ2t
u′1(c1,t+1(x1,t+1)) + µ(x2t) (13)
In a stationary equilibrium, the solution to the household problem is characterized by the above
equations, with rt = r∀t, and φ1t = φ1, φ2t = φ2∀t. In addition, as long as the Markov transition
matrices for the shocks satisfy monotone mixing condition (Hopenhayn and Prescott, 1992) and
given the assumption on rt relative to β, associated with the solution is a stationary distribution
of agents, which does not change period to period in aggregate, although individual agents
change states due to the idiosyncratic shocks.
In what follows, I describe the properties of the model related to the credit card debt puzzle.
Some of these properties are quite standard, and are presented for completeness, and in order
to highlight the features of the model that relate to the credit card debt puzzle.
Property 1. Nontrivial distribution of assets. Given the assumptions on the utility func-
tions, the equilibrium distribution of households across money and debt holdings is nondegener-
ate. That is, m2t(x1t) and b2t(x1t) are nontrivial functions of their states.
As is standard, the distribution of agents is driven by heterogeneous histories of idiosyncratic
shocks here, which reflect in the asset decisions and states m and b. This is obvious from the
Euler Equations (11) and (12), which equate the marginal utility of first-subperiod consumption
with the marginal value of carrying a dollar in cash or of “saving” a dollar by repaying debt,
and from the budget constraint. It clearly follows from this property that c1t(x1t) and c2t(x2t)
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are also nontrivial functions of their states. Having established that there is a distribution of
agents across states, I will from now on make the dependence of the decision rules on the states
implicit in the notation. I next show that it is always optimal to partially insure against the
preference shocks, and that the level of insurance will depend on the cost of insurance as well
as the individual state.
Property 2. Optimally Incomplete Insurance. In any equilibrium,
1. Optimal decisions involve partial insurance against preference shocks. That is, for any x1t,
∀t, ∃ zˆt ≤ z¯ such that c2t < m2t for all zt < zˆt, and c2t = m2t otherwise.
2. The degree of partial insurance depends on relative returns to assets, φt+1/φt, rt+1, as well
as the state x1t.
Discussion. 1. The intuition is easily seen in a stationary equilibrium, although
it carries through in any equilibrium of this problem. In a stationary equilibrium,
rt = r ∀t and φ1t = φ1 ∀t. Notice from (12) that
βEzt|zt−1Est+1|stu
′
1(c1,t+1) =
u′1(c1t)
1 + r
. (14)
¿From this and (11), we get the following equation for m2t:
φ1u
′
1(c1t) =
φ1u
′
1(c1t)
1 + r
+ φ2
∑
{zi:c2t(zi)=m2t}
Γ(zt−1, zi)µ(·),
or equivalently,
u′1(c1t)(φ1 −
φ1
1 + r
) = φ2
∑
{zi:c2t(zi)=m2t}
Γ(zt−1, zi)µ(·). (15)
Denote the right-hand side of (15) as
Ψ ≡ φ2
∑
{zi:c2t(zi)=m2t}
Γ(zt−1, zi)µ(·).
Ψ can be thought of as expected shadow value of relaxing a binding money constraint
in the second subperiod, where µ > 0 whenever the constraint binds. By Inada
conditions on the utility function, we have Ψ > 0 as long as 1+ r > 1, which implies
that the constraint on c2t binds in at least one state z if there is a wedge in returns
between money and bonds/debt.
Now suppose that the agent knows that his next realization of zt will be zt = z,
the lowest realization. In this deterministic case, the agent chooses cd1t, c
d
2t and
corresponding md2t such that
φ1u
′
1(c
d
1t) = φ2zu
′
2(c
d
2t),
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where the equality comes from combining deterministic versions of the Euler equa-
tions for m2t and c2t (11) and (13). If the realization of the next preference shock
is unknown, as in the current economy, then the agent solves, from these Euler
equations,
φ1u
′
1(c
s
1t) = Ezt|zt−1φ2ztu
′
2(c
s
2t) > φ2zu
′
2(c
d
2t).
¿From the last inequality, it is clear that cs1t < c
d
1t, while m
s
2t > m
d
2t for any agent
that is not borrowing-constrained, to keep all the Euler equations holding. In states
zt > z, c
s
2t(zt) > c
d
2t(z).
To summarize, for any x1t, there exists a cutoff level zˆt ≤ z¯, such that c2t < m2t for
zt < zˆt, and c2t = m2t otherwise.
2. Denote the agent’s assets as a1t = φ1m1t−b1t(1+r). By (15) and strict concavity
of u1(·), ∂Ψ/∂c1t < 0, and so ∂Ψ/∂a1t < 0. Also, ∂Ψ/∂r > 0. That is, an increase
in first-subperiod consumption increases the amount of insurance taken against the
preference shocks, as does an increase in assets. At the same time, an increase in the
cost of insurance r reduces the optimal amount of insurance, as long as r > 0.
I showed above that agents are constrained against achieving first-best in every realization
of zt since it is simply too costly, but that there is precautionary demand for money even if
carrying money is dominated by repaying debt (or saving in b), so that for most states except
the most constrained, for some zt, m1,t+1 > 0 - agents will have positive liquid assets at the end
of the period. As an aside, note that if there is no wedge in returns between the two assets,
agents become indifferent between them, so one can insure completely against any realization of
zt as long as one holds any nonliquid assets (that is,
∑
zi:c2t(zi)=m2t
µ(zi) = 0), while if the cost
of insurance is extremely high (r →∞), agents may choose not to hold precautionary balances
at all, so the money constraint would bind everywhere. Note also that if we fix s for any agent,
(15) gives that more asset-wealthy people prefer to insure against preference shocks more fully
- in other words, preference shocks become more important relative to income shocks, the more
assets a household has.
I next show that an interior solution to the problem admits a wedge in returns between
liquid assets and consumer credit, with the latter being more expensive. Since my analysis will
continue in partial equilibrium, an alternative way to view this is that if prices are set such that
consumer credit is more expensive than liquidity, an interior solution exists.
Property 3. Difference in rates of returns. An interior solution to the household problem
admits 1 + rt+1 >
φ1,t+1
φ1t
. In stationary equilibrium, 1 + r > 1.
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Discussion. Consider household Euler equations (11) and (12). For the majority
of the households, the credit limit constraint does not bind, so that λ(x1t) = 0, and
for these households, the Euler equations give
u′1(c1t) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st
φ1,t+1
φ1t
u′1(c1,t+1) +
φ2tµt
φ1t
}
u′1(c1t) = Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1)}
By property 2, µt(x2t) > 0 for some x2t. Thus we have Ezt|zt−1
φ2tµt
φ1t
> 0, and so it is
clear from comparing the right-hand sides of equations above that
Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st
φ1,t+1
φ1t
u′1(c1,t+1)} < Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|st(1 + rt+1)u
′
1(c1,t+1)},
and therefore,
φ1,t+1
φ1t
< 1 + rt+1.
In stationary equilibrium, this turns into
1 < 1 + r.
Property 3 and equation (15) give a complete characterization of agents’ self-insurance be-
havior. Even for very good states x1t, it is at most possible that agents carry exactly enough
money to pay for consumption c2t when the shock has its maximal realization, that is, they will
never opt to carry more money that they would spend if zt = z¯.
15 By Inada conditions on u(c2),
it is always optimal to have at least some consumption in the second subperiod, even in the
lowest state realizations.
The above discussion leads us to consider the agents’ behavior in regard to money and debt
holdings. I show that the model generates the three subgroups in the population: borrowers,
savers, and those who do both. The model thus replicates the credit card debt puzzle, at least
qualitatively.
Property 4. Optimality of different borrowing and saving behavior.
In every period, there exist three subgroups of the population:
15Note also that in the model as it is written now, incomplete insurance against preference shocks implies that
agents do not use cash holdings to insure against income shocks - these will instead, as is well-known, increase
saving/ decrease borrowing in b2t, relative to an economy with no uncertainty in income. This is because the
model abstracts from cash advances, which can prompt income uncertainty to be a second channel to affect
precautionary demand in money. See the Discussion section for further details.
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- Borrowers have m2t > 0, b2t > 0 but m1,t+1 = 0;
- Borrowers and savers have m2t > 0, b2t > 0 and m1,t+1 > 0;
- Savers have b2t ≤ 0, while m2t > 0 and m1,t+1 ≥ 0.
Of those who borrow in any given period, a positive measure of agents will borrow again in the
next, that is, b1t > 0 and b2t > 0 (debt revolving).
Discussion. By property 2, m2t > 0 for all agents in all states. Moreover, since
partial insurance is optimal, for any asset level and some realizations of shock zt, the
money constraint binds, while for others it does not, so we havem1,t+1 = m2t−c2t = 0
for some (x1t, zt), while m1,t+1 > 0 for other (x1t, zt). Thus we have the money
holding combinations for the three subgroups.
It remains to show that b2t > 0 for some states x1t. Suppose household’s assets at
are at some very low level such that only minimal insurance is optimal, as given by
(15), and we get µ(·) > 0∀ z, so from Euler equations (11) and (13),
φ1tu
′
1(c1t) > Ezt|zt−1{βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1)}
ztu
′
2(c2t) >
1
φ2t
βEst+1|stφ1,t+1u
′
1(c1,t+1).
That is, these agents value present consumption more than future consumption, and
are willing to shift assets from tomorrow to today in order to reduce the inequalities.
They are able to do so by borrowing, so we have b2t > 0. In the next period, those
who still have low assets will have to “repay” current debt by borrowing more, so
they are revolving the present debt, and we have b1,t+1 > 0 and b2,t+1 > 0.
This last property shows that at different asset positions, it is optimal for the households in
the model to engage in differing borrowing and saving behavior, thus potentially delivering the
three subgroups that are observed in the data. It is important to note, however, that analytically
it is impossible to say whether in the stationary distribution, households will actually find
themselves at all of these asset positions. For example, we know that for some low level of assets
a household will borrow. But we do not know whether any model household will actually have
that low level of assets. This question can only be answered quantitatively, and in the next
section, I show that such low levels of assets do in fact occur in the calibrated model.
To summarize, the model delivers all of the empirically desirable features of the credit card
debt puzzle in the data: precautionary demand for money, existence of an equilibrium when
credit is costly, and a subdivision of the population into three groups with liquid saving and
borrowing behavior akin to those in the data. Note that the aggregate distribution of the
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population is plausible in this respect: people with very low assets and low shocks are borrowers,
people in the middle of the asset and shock-history distribution are the puzzle group, while those
at the top are savers only. Finally, it is important to note that households in the model will move
in and out of the “puzzle” subgroup depending on their shock histories, so that no households
would be in this situation permanently. I now calibrate and compute the model, in order to
evaluate the power of the liquidity need hypothesis to account for the credit card debt puzzle.
4 Computation
For the purposes of computation, I make some adjustments to the model. First, I make the utility
function nonseparable, combining u1(c1t) and ztu2(c2t) above into u(c1t, ztc2t), and assuming
that the utility function is thrice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in both
arguments, and its third derivative is strictly positive. Inada conditions are also assumed to
hold. The reason to make the utility function non-separable is that in reality there is likely
to be an interaction between household spending on cash-only goods and spending on cash-or-
credit goods, and this interaction should not be ignored in calibration. Second, I introduce an
interest spread for saving and borrowing, to match it in the data: borrowing on credit cards
carries a much higher interest rate than saving in other financial assets does, on average. As this
is a partial equilibrium model, these prices are set exogenously. Also, I normalize φjt = 1∀ j, t,
which is innocuous given that I am not studying monetary policy-related issues, and in addition,
I will focus on the stationary equilibrium, so that all aggregate variables will be constant.
Finally, in order to reduce computation time, I reduce the state space in the first subperiod
(no such possibility exists in the second). In particular, define assets (“cash-at-hand”) to be,
given assumptions on prices listed above:
at = m1t − b1t(1 + rt), where
rt = r
b if b1t > 0
rt = r
s < rb if b1t < 0
The first-subperiod problem can be then rewritten as:
V1(st, zt−1, at) = max
c1t,b2t,m2t
Ezt|zt−1V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t, c1t) (16)
s.t. c1t +m2t − b2t = st + at.
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Given all the adjustments, the second-subperiod problem becomes:
V2(st, zt,m2t, b2t, c1t) = max
c2t
u(c1t, ztc2t) + βEst+1|stV1(st+1, zt, at+1) (17)
s.t. c2t ≤ m2t
at+1 = m2t − c2t − b2t(1 + rt+1),
where the interest rate r is determined by whether or not the agent borrows or saves. As before,
this problem is well-behaved and the solution exists, given the utility function specification and
appropriate boundary conditions, which in practice amount to setting bounds on the constraint
set that do not restrict the decision rules. I solve the problem of the household in two stages:
the first-subperiod problem (the outer maximization) is solved by value function iteration with
piecewise linear interpolation, while the second-subperiod problem (the inner maximization)
is solved directly from the first-order condition, by approximating the derivative of the value
function. The inner maximization can, alternatively, be solved by value function iteration as
well - results are completely robust to the choice of method.
5 Calibration
I choose model period to be a month, which is a natural frequency for studying household
decisions that involve credit card statements and paychecks. The functional form for the house-
hold utility function is of the standard CRRA form, which incorporates a CES consumption
aggregator between the two consumption goods:
u(c1t, ztc2t) =
((1 − α)cν1t + ztαc
ν
2t)
1−γ
ν
1− γ
with γ > 1.
This choice satisfies all the necessary assumptions on the utility function listed above. The utility
function gives three parameters to calibrate: α, ν and γ. β, the discount factor, is the fourth.
The other parameters have to do with the shock processes on income and preferences, as well
as prices. I calibrate the parameters of the income process outside the model, set γ to be in the
standard range in the literature, set the prices to those reported in the SCF, and calibrate the
remaining parameters within the model. I perform this within-model calibration by a minimum
distance estimator based on the simulated method of moments. As is standard, I select the target
moments so that they cover the relevant properties of data and provide discipline in calibrating
30
the model, but the moments are all unrelated to the main data observations that I am trying to
explain - the size of the credit card debt puzzle in the data, as well as the magnitude of money
holdings that households choose to keep. Thus, these key quantities of interest are left free to
speak for the performance of the liquidity need hypothesis in accounting for the puzzle at hand.
Some of the exogenously calibrated parameters are set as follows. I will compute the model
twice, once with the risk aversion parameter γ = 2, and once with γ = 3, chosen in the lower
and middle part of the standard range in the literature, in order to demonstrate some of the
possible range of outcomes. The monthly interest rate on saving in nonliquid financial assets is
set to match the annual rate of 4%, so that rs = 0.0033. I set rb = 0.011, which corresponds to
the annual rate of 14%, the average interest rate paid on revolving credit card debt as reported
by the debtors I observe in the SCF.
5.1 Income Process
The calibration of the income process is non-trivial in the context of this study. The standard
calibration procedure of the income process parameters involves imposing an AR(1) process
with normally distributed errors on income data from household surveys such as the PSID
(e.g., Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron, 2004a, 2004b). However, micro data sources that have
good measurements of income provide income data with an annual frequency only. Imposing
an AR(1) process on annual data and using time disaggregation to get the monthly frequency
leads to an extremely persistent monthly process with little variance, which generates little
information about income uncertainty on a monthly basis. Thus, my approach has to depart
from this practice. Instead, I pose a 4-state discrete Markov process as follows (see table 9).
The income states are chosen to match the relative average earnings of white-collar workers (s4),
blue-collar and service sector workers (s3), and the value of unemployment benefits (set at about
20% of the respective earnings) for white-collar and blue-collar workers (s2 and s1). This is one
of several possible choices: for example, one could choose relative earnings of college-educated
versus non-college-educated workers instead. The reason I pose two unemployment states will
be clear momentarily. I take the data on relative earnings above from the 2004 Bureau of Labor
Statistics reports on earnings of full-time workers by occupation. Note that while one might like
to have a greater number of income states, the key limitation in the number of states I can pose
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is that I have to calibrate the transition matrix between the income states, which prevents me
from using, say, income quantiles - there are not enough relevant data at monthly frequency to
compute a richer set of transition dynamics in question. This is not a severe limitation in this
context, as I discuss below.
In order to calibrate transition probabilities between income states, I use the following data.
The average duration of unemployment in 2001, according to the BLS, was 13.5 weeks. This
duration tends to be a bit longer for white-collar workers than for blue-collar workers, around
14.1 and 13 weeks respectively. Moreover, the shares of blue-collar and white-collar workers
among the unemployed averaged 56% and 44% in 2001, respectively. I do not observe to which
jobs the workers exit, so I assume that the vast majority of exits from unemployment is into
same-sector jobs, allowing only small probabilities of transitioning to the other collar, probably
understating the extent of such mobility a bit. This information together gives the probabilities
of exiting white-collar and blue-collar unemployment and staying in it from month to month.
There is no transition between the two unemployment states.
Associated with the transition matrix Γs is the invariant distribution of agents across the
three income states. Denoting this distribution as {γ∗1 , γ
∗
2 , γ
∗
3 , γ
∗
4}, I get two additional conditions:
γ∗1 + γ
∗
2 should equal the average monthly unemployment rate, which was 4.75% in 2001, and
this is distributed between the two states according to the relative shares of blue- and white-
collar workers among the unemployed, as detailed above. γ∗3 is the share of blue-collar workers
among the employed, which was 43.5% in 2001. γ∗4 is the complement of the other three. These
invariant shares give conditions to complete the first two columns of the transition matrix. Note
that a white-collar worker cannot transition into blue-collar unemployment and vice versa. This
clarifies why I have two unemployment states: this way, I avoid artificially high mobility of
blue-collar workers into white-collar jobs via the state of unemployment, and vice versa.
What remains is the lower-right 2x2 matrix, which gives persistence of white-collar and blue-
collar jobs and the transition between them. I calibrate the probability of transitioning from a
blue-collar job to a white-collar job to upward mobility rates for blue-collar workers, as computed
by the BLS and reported by Gabriel (2003). The reported average monthly probability of an
upward occupational move by a blue-collar worker was around 0.7% in 1998-1999. It is plausible
that in 2001, this number might have declined slightly, due to a shift in economic conditions, but
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Table 9: Earnings Process
Parameters Value
Earnings states {s1, s2, s3, s4} { 0.14, 0.2, 0.589, 1.0 }
Transition matrix Γ(st, st+1)


0.667 0 0.332 0.001
0 0.694 0.002 0.304
0.021 0 0.972 0.007
0 0.012 0.006 0.982


Invariant distribution in earnings Γ∗s { 0.026, 0.021, 0.414, 0.538 }
as I do not have specific information to that effect, I use this statistic here. This completes the
third row of the matrix, and together with the invariant distribution, allows for the completion
of the fourth row as well.
This calibration has a clear limitation: it has no hope of capturing the top tail of the income
distribution, nor indeed does it mimic the overall income inequality in the U.S. The top income
level is only seven times the lowest income level in this calibration. On the other hand, over
one-half of the population experiences the highest (also most persistent) income state; that is,
the bottom tail is also clearly understated in the model.
However, for the current exercise, it is not a significant problem. First, the credit card debt
puzzle, as I demonstrated in my data analysis, is a phenomenon concentrated in the middle
of the distribution, with mean and median incomes far below the top tail. Thus, understating
the top tail of the distribution will restrict me from matching the top tail in the model, but
that population group is not of most concern for the question at hand. Second, insofar as I
understate the bottom tail of the data income distribution, I am biasing my results on the size
of the borrower-and-saver group downwards - so the result of the computation can then be seen
as a lower bound on what the model can account for. Third, insofar as the top outliers in
the data affect the difference between the mean and median puzzle households (as presented
in the data section), I will particularly focus on the analysis of the model’s results pertaining
to the median household, rather than the mean, thus removing the results’ dependence on the
calibration of the distributions’ top tail.
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5.2 Idiosyncratic Preference Risk
The remaining parameters – the discount rate β, the parameters of the consumption aggregator
α and ν, and the preference process parameters – are calibrated together, from within the
model, using a minimum-distance estimator based on the simulated method of moments. In this
subsection, I describe in some detail the calibration of preference shocks. In the subsection that
follows, the remaining parameters are described.
For the preference shock parameters, I assume that the log of the preference shock, log(zt),
follows an AR(1) process with a Gaussian disturbance, so the parameters to calibrate will be
a persistence parameter ρz and standard deviation σz of this process. I then discretize this
AR(1) into a five-state Markov chain. The choice of an AR(1) is motivated by the idea that
households have both constant pre-committed expenditures, and some additional expenditure
shocks (extreme events), both of which have to be captured in the shock process. In terms of
data already described, the shock’s AR(1) is meant to mirror the AR(1) in the residual of liquid
consumption εt, as described in (1).
The preference shock process is clearly not observed in the data, but the way households
respond to these shocks is, through their liquid consumption. Thus, the preference shock process
has to match properties of consumption of cash-only goods in the data, namely its persistence
(measured as autocorrelation) and volatility (conditional standard deviation). In the calibra-
tion targets, conditional standard deviation is computed by subgroup, so in total, I get four
calibration targets for the shock process.
Finally, as I described in the data section, the properties of liquid consumption – crucially the
volatility of consumption – are sensitive to how the cash-good group is computed. Specifically,
of all the measures that I have examined, the benchmark measure (the most inclusive) produces
the smallest volatility of consumption; in addition, the exclusion of many expenses that may
embody extreme events (like medical shocks and so on) is likely to constrain this measure further.
In the estimation, I use this most conservative measure - the benchmark - so as to discipline the
model in the best way possible. But one should keep in mind that this may be one reason for
why the results of the model are a lower bound.
In order to convince the reader that normal disturbances are a reasonable assumption for
the shocks, and also that the calibration does not overstate the tail shocks through such a
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Residuals, All Households (N=25,968)
Figure 1: Liquid Log-Consumption Residuals, Benchmark Cash Good Measure, All Households
representation, figure 1 plots the consumption residual εit, together with a nonparametric kernel
estimator of its density (thick red line) and the corresponding normal approximation (thin green
line). It is very important to recall here that the right tail of the calibration (the highest
preference shock(s)) is key for determining money holdings - it is the highest shock(s), which
cause the money constraint of the household to bind, that drive the amount of precautionary
demand for liquidity. Thus, the calibration of the right tail of the shock distribution is important
for the results on liquidity demand. The figure is presented here only for the benchmark measure
of cash goods, although the graph looks similar - just with wider tails and lower middle density
- for other measures (excluding food, property taxes, etc.) mentioned in the data section. The
graphs do not change if the residuals are considered by subgroups of households. Finally, for
the transitory component ηit and for quarterly CEX, the graphs look very similar, and are not
shown here for space considerations.
While this graph represents households’ response to the expense shocks rather than the
shocks themselves, the figure is instructive. As is apparent, normal distribution approximates
the actual residuals fairly well. It understates the density of consumption at the mean (which
will be corrected by the fact that I will match the autocorrelation of consumption as a targeted
moment), but overstates consumption very near the mean (within one standard deviation), and
understates the tails of the density. The tails of this consumption distribution are very wide,
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especially the right tail, which extends to about 12 standard deviations away from the mean;
we may speculate that the distribution of the actual shocks thus has even wider tails. I treat
this right tail very conservatively in the calibration, however. First, in my discretization of the
shocks by the Tauchen method, I restrict the five discrete states to fall only within two standard
deviations of the mean. This approximates the AR(1) well, but is clearly an understatement
of the actual tails of the distribution, particularly the right tail. Also, I only target up to
the second moment of the residual distribution in the data, without attempting to match the
tails. If I were to match the tails, the discrete shocks would have to include a much higher top
realization than the one that I allow for currently. Once again, I impose this restriction to keep
the calibration very conservative, with the goal of getting a disciplined, if understated, answer
to the quantitative question; but it is important to keep in mind that this discipline will affect
directly the implications of the model for the magnitude of liquidity demand.
5.3 Remaining Parameters and Mapping to Targets
Together with ρz and σz, I also estimate β, α and ν. For this purpose, in addition to the
properties of liquid consumption mentioned above, I choose four more targets – mean cash-only
good consumption relative to income for each of the subgroups, and the mean revolving debt-
to-income ratio in the population. Although all eight calibration targets jointly determine all
five parameters, there is also a fairly direct mapping between the targets and the parameters.
The consumption-to-income ratios by subgroup help pin down α. β is pinned down by the
debt-to-income ratio. The time series properties of liquid consumption help determine the shock
process, as discussed above, and also help determine ν.
The estimation of the parameter ν – which determines the degree of substitutability between
liquid and nonliquid consumption – deserves some attention. Previous estimates of the parameter
of substitutability between liquid and nonliquid consumption come from deterministic cash-
credit good models, in which the cash-in-advance constraint always binds, so that (aggregate)
cash-good consumption equals (aggregate) money demand. A direct implication of this class
of models is that the elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods can be measured
as the regression coefficient that gauges sensitivity of aggregate money demand to the gross
nominal interest rate. This parameter turns out to be quite high in the data (0.79-0.84, see
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e.g. Chari, Christiano, Kehoe 1991), which means that the estimated elasticity of substitution
between cash and credit goods is also high (4.76-6) - that is, cash and credit goods appear to
be substitutes. (This practice in existing literature could be misleading, since it maps liquidity
demand in a model with no precautionary demand to money demand in the data, where there
may be significant precautionary motive present, so that aggregate liquid consumption may not
in fact equal aggregate money demand.) In my model, instead, cash-good consumption and
money demand are distinct, due to the presence of idiosyncratic risk, where the cash-in-advance
constraint is often not binding. As a result, the model no longer has a closed-form implication for
the parameter ν. In the individual shock realizations where the constraint does not bind, liquid
consumption is not sensitive to the nominal interest rate (see Telyukova and Visschers, 2009, for
rigorous analysis of this fact). Thus, once idiosyncratic preference uncertainty is introduced into
the model, aggregate liquid consumption becomes much less sensitive to nominal interest rates
than money demand. Insofar as the elasticity of substitution can still be linked to this sensitivity,
this reasoning leads to the conclusion that the elasticity will be much lower in this model than in
the deterministic models used previously - this sensitivity is tied, in particular, to the probability
that the money shock binds, which is around 6.7% in this calibration. I am able to construct a
direct measure of household cash-good consumption from the micro data, and use the properties
of this series, together with the interest spread, to pin down ν. Note that cross-sectional variation
between the subgroups along the ratios of consumption to earnings and standard deviation of
liquid consumption is linked to the preference shock process, but that process is restricted to be
the same for all groups. What contributes to the cross-sectional variation is the interest spread
rb/rs, where each subgroup faces a different tradeoff with respect to this ratio (borrower-savers,
for instance, are faced with the spread, while borrowers and savers are not, in any given period).
But the interest ratio is fixed exogenously and is time-invariant. Given this, the cross-sectional
variation in targets that are computed by subgroup pins down ν, by distinguishing between the
three subgroups of households in terms of the marginal opportunity cost of holding money that
they face.
A word on the last target, the debt-to-income ratio. It is meant to gauge how well the model
does in reproducing a dimension of the aggregate economy. Given that the focus of the paper
is on the part of the population who have revolving debt, it seems like the natural statistic to
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target. There are many ways to measure this target in the data, as there are many possible
definitions of debt. For the purposes of this estimation, I choose aggregate aggregate revolving
unsecured debt (the majority of which is credit card debt), computed in the SCF. In principle,
debt could be measured as unsecured and secured revolving debt - allowing to include home
equity lines of credit, for example - but as the SCF in 2001 does not show significant uptake of
such lines of credit, and since my model has no role for housing or collateral more generally, I
use only unsecured revolving debt as a measure.16
There is one other important detail in my calculation of the aggregate target ratio of debt to
income. Because the income calibration does not represent the top tail of the income distribution
well, the calibrated model will by design have a hard time matching the average asset statistics
for the whole population, and attempting to do so may bias estimates. To account for this
limitation, I map the aggregate target to the income calibration in the following way: I compute
and target in estimation the debt ratio in the bottom 75% of the 2001 U.S. income distribution,
rather than in the whole population. Note that doing so does not change the debt dispersion
in the data all that significantly, so that the average debt-to-income ratio is only slightly above
what it would be in the population as a whole. For example, revolving debt-to-income ratio in
the whole population is about 5% - compare that to the measure for the bottom-75 % of the
income distribution used here of 5.8 %.17
In sum, I estimate the five parameters within the model based on eight moments. For each
set of parameters in the minimization process, the procedure solves the model, simulates a 502-
month panel of 100,000 households, computes the moments from it, and compares them with
the moments in the data. The complexity of the problem prevents me from using gradient-
based minimization methods. Thus, for the minimization I use the simplex method of Nelder
16The uptake of home equity lines of credit (HELOC’s) surged significantly at the end of 2001, as a result
of record-low interest rates and many households refinancing their mortgages, at which time they were offered
HELOC’s for free. This increase, at 30% a year, lasted until 2005 or so, according to the Federal Reserve Board.
The 2001 survey data were thus collected too early to reflect this upsurge.
17The fact that the aggregate target concerns only the bottom 75% of the population may raise the question of
why the other targets are not calculated for the same subsection of the data sample. The reason is that much of the
other analysis is done by subgroup, with each subgroup already located somewhere on a specific subsection of the
income distribution. I have computed all the targets for the bottom-75% however, to find that consumption-to-
income ratios will increase for all the subgroups in question to around 0.70-0.72, while autocorrelation of log liquid
consumption and its standard deviation remain unchanged. Thus, changing the targets to bottom-75% would
actually favor my model, because an increase in average consumption-to-income ratios would likely produce some
increase in the optimal household liquidity holdings as well.
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Table 10: Calibration Targets - Data and Model
Target Data Model Model
(γ = 2) (γ = 3)
Liquid consumption/earnings ratioa: Borrowers 0.719 0.881 0.928
Borrowers & savers 0.618 0.621 0.602
Savers 0.629 0.630 0.641
Autocorrelation (annual) of log liquid consumption: 0.226 0.225 0.228
Percent cond’l. st. dev. of log liquid consumptiona: Borrowers 0.228 0.138 0.111
Borrowers & savers 0.235 0.230 0.236
Savers 0.245 0.265 0.274
Mean debt/income ratiob,c 0.058 0.058 0.058
Notes: (a) The cash-only good series is the benchmark measure. (b) Debt is measured as revolving
unsecured debt. (c) The moment is computed for the bottom 75% of the U.S. income distribution.
and Mead (1965), parallelized at parameter level as suggested by Lee and Wiswall (2007). The
weighting matrix is the identity matrix in the first step, subsequently adjusted to correct for
moments computed with highest variance (those moments that concern the borrower group,
which is smallest in the data). Data covariances of the moments in question are not possible to
compute in this exercise, since the moments come from two different data sets.
6 Results
6.1 Model Fit and Resulting Parameters
From this point forward, I will discuss the results of two calibrations, with the risk aversion
parameter set alternately to 2 and 3. In each case, all the parameters are re-estimated to
the same targets. In order to assess the fit of the calibrated model, table 10 presents the target
moments in the data and the model. As discussed above, I have eight targets and five parameters:
this overidentification means that I do not have enough instruments to match all of the moments
perfectly, but the closeness of the match allows to judge the fit of the model. The calibrated
model fits most targets closely. The crucial moments concern the borrower-and-saver group
and the debt-to-income ratio. The saver group is also important. For these, both the liquid
consumption-to-income ratio and the volatility of cash-only good consumption are matched quite
well, and further, autocorrelation of liquid consumption, measured across subgroups, is matched
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nearly perfectly. The γ = 3 calibration creates more dispersion between the subgroups, so the
estimated parameters match the borrower-saver group best, and diverge a bit more for the saver
group. This concerns particularly the standard deviation of liquid consumption, which is higher
in the model than it is in the data for the saver group. That is, in the model the savers are a bit
more responsive to the expense shocks than they appear to be in the data. For the borrower-
saver group, instead, the model with γ = 2 understates that volatility slightly, while it gets it
exactly right with γ = 3.18
The borrower subgroup presents a challenge to the model, as is evident in the targets: the
model does not match the borrowers’ characteristics particularly closely, overpredicting their
liquid consumption-to-income ratio, and significantly underpredicting the volatility of their liquid
consumption. The reason is clear. It is very difficult to match the group I call “borrowers” in
the data with that group in the model. In the data, these are households that report having no,
or very little, liquidity. In practice, what the survey data do not measure is holdings of cash, and
there is likely a number of households whose liquidity holdings are much higher than what we
observe, due to it being held as cash rather than in a bank account. In addition, for the 12 months
of expenditures in the data, I only have one annual observation of the household’s asset position
- so I cannot observe the household’s subgroup status changes from month to month. This may
overstate the duration of borrower status for some households, and may thus make their time
series characteristics appear closer to other groups than they are in reality. In the model, the
only households that appear as borrowers are those who get hit by a binding expense shock, so
that they spend all of their money by the end of any given month. This includes two types of
households: those who perpetually hold very little liquidity, so that their liquidity constraint
binds in (nearly) all preference shock realizations, and those who hold sizeable liquidity but
encounter the worst shock realization. The model, due to properties of the income calibration
(with understated tails), will have trouble generating enough of the former. The latter group,
those with the worst preference shock realizations, is unlikely to stay in the borrower category
for long. This makes it difficult to measure the time-series characteristics of the borrowers’
expenses over time: the former group dominates in the model, and their expenses are nearly
18In case there is a concern that the difference in results between the two calibrations is created by this
difference in standard deviations, in the process of estimation, many parameter combinations were evaluated
where the standard deviation was allowed to vary quite a bit; the results remain very robust to this variation,
subject to a particular choice of γ.
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Table 11: Calibration
Parameter Value 1 Value 2
Interest rates rs 0.0033 0.0033
(annual rs = 0.04)
rb 0.0107 0.0107
(annual rb = 0.14)
Risk aversion/IES γ 2.0 3.0
Discount rate β 0.9924 0.9913
(annual βa = 0.9130) (βa = 0.9009)
Consumption aggregator α 0.6270 0.6238
parameters ν -1.5176 -1.5204
Preference shock process: ρz 0.4727 0.4724
AR(1) with discretization σz 0.5670 0.5175
constant, so volatility is understated relative to the data; their liquid expense-to-income ratio is
likely to be overpredicted as well.
The final target, the average debt-to-annual-income ratio, is matched perfectly in both cali-
brations.
Table 11 presents the resulting parameterization. The discount factor in the two calibrations
is equivalent to 0.9-0.91 in annual terms. The parameters of the utility function are in themselves
of interest and a contribution of this paper: to date, to my knowledge, in liquidity-based models,
these parameters were estimated in deterministic cash-in-advance models only. α, the weight
on cash-only goods in the CES utility function, is 0.62-0.63, which once again confirms that
they are an important part of a household’s expenditures - not surprising given that payments
to mortgages and household repairs fall under this heading. The parameter that measures
elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods is approximately ν = −1.5, that is, cash
and credit goods are complements rather than substitutes, with the elasticity of substitution of
0.4. Comparing these with other estimates from the literature, Chari et al (1991) and others
after them find an estimate for α of around 0.62, which is the same as my estimate and this is
encouraging. Their ν, as I mentioned above, tends to be on the order of 0.79-0.84, producing the
elasticity of substitution on the order of 4.5 to 6. I already discussed in the calibration section
the reasons for why it can be reasonably expected that a model where the cash-in-advance
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constraint does not bind for the majority of households will have this elasticity of substitution
much lower: once aggregate liquid consumption is disconnected from aggregate money demand,
the sensitivity of liquid consumption to the nominal interest rate is apt to drop significantly
relative to previous estimates, leading to a drop in the elasticity parameter. My estimation
results, using micro data, confirm this.
Finally, the estimates of the preference process are of importance, since this study presents
a new (and to my knowledge, first) effort to quantify unobservable idiosyncratic uncertainty to
preferences from microdata specific to liquidity needs. The estimated monthly AR(1) parameter
on log(z) is around 0.47. The AR(1) specification is flexible, encompassing anything from a very
persistent shock process to an i.i.d. one. The high outlier preference shock states are likely
to be extreme events, as consumption patterns in the data would suggest, so we would expect
their persistence to be low. The estimate of 0.47 suggests that the extreme realizations of the
shock are relatively rare and rarely persist for more than one period. The standard deviation
of the shock process is estimated at 0.51-0.57, with the lower parameter needed in the model
with the higher risk aversion coefficient. As partial insurance is always optimal and agents
prefer to smooth consumption, it is intuitive that the observed consumption process “mutes”
the variability of the underlying shock process. With higher curvature, the precautionary motive
is enhanced, hence lower variation of the underlying shock is needed to accomplish the observed
variation of consumption in the data. It is interesting to note that variability of the shock itself
is more than twice the variability of observed liquid consumption.
Based on the analysis of the calibration targets, the parameterization described above pro-
duces a realistic economy in terms of its mapping to the relevant data dimensions; the moments
that are not as well matched in estimation are missed for reasons external to the model and by
design, and with consequences not central to the puzzle in question, which is discussed in the
next section.
6.2 The Credit Card Debt Puzzle
As mentioned before, I left the magnitudes of interest for answering the central question of this
paper untargeted in calibration. This freedom allows me to measure exactly how much of the
puzzle is accounted for by the liquidity need hypothesis with preference uncertainty as the main
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Table 12: Results - Subgroup Size (Percent)
Data Model Model
(γ = 2) (γ = 3)
Borrowers 5.2 2.5 1.8
Borrowers & savers 27.1 28.3 23.0
Savers 67.7 69.3 75.3
driving force. To measure this, I focus on the size of the subgroups (borrowers, borrowers-and-
savers, and savers), as well as liquidity holdings that each subgroup optimally chooses.
Table 12 gives the size of the three subgroups in the data and the model. In the model,
the size of the borrower-and-saver group is between 23 and 28% of the population, while in the
data, it is 27%. Thus, the model accounts for between 85% and 104% of the puzzle group,
overpredicting its size very slightly for the calibration with the lower risk aversion parameter.
Further, the model slightly overstates the size of the saver group, at the cost of understating
the size of the borrower group. The reasons for why the borrower group is underpredicted was
already discussed above. Primarily, the model’s borrower group consists only of those who are
constrained at the end of the month, while in the data, there may be some households who have
very few liquid assets throughout the month and year; these households are not captured by the
model, since it is never optimal to hold zero liquidity in this model.
In order to measure liquid assets, I have to define what the money holdings observed in
the data are. As discussed, a cross-sectional average of money holdings in the SCF reflects
an average monthly amount of money in the bank accounts, since households are continually
interviewed throughout the month. This cannot apply to the borrower group, however: it is not
likely that all households in this group truly never hold liquid assets during the month, given
their average liquid spending documented above, so many of these may be households observed
at the end of the month who have drawn down all of their liquid assets, most likely due to
binding resource constraints. Since in the model I observe money holdings at two points during
the month, rather than just one, I study average monthly money holdings for all households
to map to the observed amount in the data; it should be kept in mind, however, that the data
money holdings for the borrower group might be more aptly compared to end-month liquidity
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Table 13: Results - Liquid-Asset-to-Income Ratio, Monthly Average, Median Household
Data Model Model/Data Model Model/Data
(γ = 2) (γ = 3)
Borrowers 0.10 0.41 4.10 0.43 4.30
Borrowers & savers 0.79 0.44 0.56 0.49 0.62
Savers 0.88 0.55 0.62 0.59 0.67
holdings of this group, which is equal to 0.
In table 13, I present average monthly liquid asset holdings relative to income for a median
household in each subgroup, in the data and in the model. I focus on the median household in
both the model and the data, since, for reasons having to do with the difficulty of matching the
upper tails of both the income and wealth distributions, the model is strongly biased from the
outset toward medians, rather than means. The “Model/Data” columns translate the model’s
results into per-dollar amounts relative to the data. In particular, for the median household in
the puzzle group, the model matches between 56 and 62 cents of every dollar held by the median
borrower-saver household in the data, depending on the calibration. This range is 62-67 cents for
the median household in the saver group. For the borrowers, the model generates over 400% of
the money holdings in the data, based on the average monthly liquidity holdings. As discussed
above, it may be more appropriate for the borrower group to compare the data number to the
end of the month liquid holdings, which is 0 in the model. 19
7 Discussion of the Results
The results presented above lead to the conclusion that demand for liquidity - for predetermined
expenses and precautionary reasons - is a key factor in accounting for the credit card debt puzzle.
In light of this analysis, the puzzle appears much less puzzling.
One part of analysis presented here cannot be made entirely criticism-proof: namely, the
19For the sake of completeness, the model’s performance for the average household in the borrower-saver group
in the data is as follows. I emphasize that the model is not calibrated to speak to the upper tail and hence
averages; the liquidity/earnings ratio in the data for the borrower-saver group is very different for the median
(0.8) versus mean (1.7) household, while in the model they are much closer to each other. For the borrower-saver
group and monthly average liquidity holdings, the model generates between 32 and 34 cents of the dollar held
by the average borrower-saver household in the data. Under a different, more disperse, calibration of income, for
example, the model would do a much better job for the average data household as well.
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measurement of liquid consumption, and particularly, of its volatility. The data are limited
as to the information they give along this dimension, and assumptions have to be made along
the way in order to complete the measurement. However, I have tried to be explicit as to
the assumptions that I made, and to argue for these assumptions based on robustness of the
measures. I showed that the group that I use as cash-only consumption goods are a conservative
group, especially when it comes to measuring volatility of this consumption and mapping it to
expense shocks. On the one hand, many of the goods included in this group are “smooth”, in
the sense that households consume relatively constant amounts of these goods every month, in
a pre-determined way. As I showed in the data section, as I begin to omit goods that are of
the more predictable nature - even those that might not be paid on a monthly basis, such as
property taxes and insurance payments - the volatility of the measured residual goes up, not
down, and the increase is very significant. On the other hand, I also omit many situations
from this group that may represent true emergencies that may be paid by liquid assets, such as
durable purchases that happen as a way to replace, rather than repair, an unexpectedly broken
unit (like car or appliance), medical expenses, etc. Finally, the discretization of shocks that I
use to represent the underlying preference uncertainty process is limited to realizations of only
two standard deviations away from the mean, and I target only up to the second moment of
the liquid consumption distribution, rather than matching the wide tails, which I presented in
the calibration section. My conclusion from these points is that the expense uncertainty that
households may face is possibly much higher than the measurements that I used. My choices
were based on giving the model strict discipline; to the extent that the shocks in the data are
possibly a lot higher, optimal precautionary liquidity demand will also be much higher.
A related concern that sometimes arises is that even if an expense shock comes along of the
nature described here, the expense itself can be postponed. I emphasize that I calibrate the
expense shocks to micro data. If households choose to postpone some of the expenses that arise,
this will be reflected in lower volatility of liquid consumption and possibly higher persistence.
Since I measure both in the data, and use both as targets for my model, I do not believe this to
be a concern for the exercise.
There are several other ways in which the current results on liquidity demand by the
borrower-saver group (and others) may be seen as a lower bound. For example, money de-
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mand can be directly affected by aspects not captured by the model; one that comes to mind
is the minimum balance requirement on checking accounts. Many checking accounts allow their
holder to avoid sizeable fees by maintaining a minimum balance in the account at all times.
Anecdotally, this minimum balance requirement can go as high as $1,000 or more. I do not
account for such a minimum balance requirement in the model, in large part because I do not
have data on what these requirements might be and what the share of the population is that has
them. If, however, it is assumed that many or all checking account balances have some minimum
positive amount that they need to exceed, then the total amount of liquidity that I can account
for will rise by the share of the total account balance that such a minimum balance captures
in the data.20 The argument would, of course, be more nuanced given that one would have to
consider when it may be optimal to dip below the minimum balance for a household that finds
itself in the borrowing-and-saving situation. But if this situation is temporary, this channel may
still increase the puzzle household’s liquidity demand in the model, and it will certainly increase
the demand of saver households.
Finally, and in my view most importantly, the model currently captures only one channel
that gives rise to precautionary liquidity demand, namely, preference uncertainty. There is, of
course, a second source of uncertainty in the model - income uncertainty - but it plays a role
only in generating disperse nonliquid asset holdings, as households insure against this shock by
saving or borrowing in the asset b. The reason for the lack of a link between income uncertainty
and liquidity demand is that it is costless in the first subperiod to acquire additional liquidity
from a credit card in the event of a low income shock. Yet this link may be important: even
predictable expenses may require precautionary money holdings in the face of income risk. For
example, if one should lose one’s job and paycheck, one still needs to pay the mortgage each
month. And in reality, unlike in the model, getting liquid assets on the spot from any source
other than the bank account is actually very costly. The most available method, as of 2001,
was a cash advance from a credit card, which would incur a withdrawal fee of several percent
of the amount withdrawn, and in addition, would incur an interest rate much higher than that
20For example, for a median household with a $3,000 liquidity holding, if the minimum balance on its account
were $1,000, then that $1,000 would be unusable for daily expenses, assuming the household wants to avoid fees,
which can be sizeable. Thus, I would only have to account for $2,000 in this account. Since my model matches
56-62% of the total median balance, which translates to $1,680-1,860, with the minimum balance requirement, I
would be capturing 84-93% of “operational” liquidity balance of such a household.
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on credit card purchases (20-25% versus 14%, on average). Further, this interest would begin
accumulating immediately upon withdrawal, without a grace period. There is also an additional
cost which is that if a household has a balance on a credit card and has a cash advance on it, any
payment applied toward the card account goes toward the lower-interest balance first. Thus, a
household without a paycheck would find itself in an extremely costly borrowing situation if it
did not have extra money in the bank. Borrowing from sources other than credit cards, such
as bank loans, is also costly: bank loans and real estate loans tend to be large lump sums, and
involve significant opening/closing costs and time delays.
The idea, then, is that both preference (expense) and income uncertainty, both of which
are present in the data, may provide a precautionary motive for holding liquidity for most
households. I have disentangled the influence of one. Extending the model by adding a direct
cost of transfers from consumer credit to liquidity, and recomputing and recalibrating it to
quantify how all the costs of borrowing affect demand for liquidity, is a worthwhile but difficult
exercise, in that the model thus extended becomes much more difficult to solve due to additional
non-convexities and the expansion of an already large state space. Thus, it is beyond the scope
of this paper to implement such an extension in full. However, in computing two-period versions
of the benchmark and the extended models, I found that income uncertainty adds to liquidity
demand significantly: in the example, liquidity demand increased by 30-50% relative to the
benchmark case, depending on the exact asset specification. Although these results should be
taken as only indicative absent a full recalibration, the numbers would translate to matching
between 72 and 85% of the liquidity holdings of the median “puzzle” household. These results
are highly suggestive that the liquidity hypothesis, although already a strong candidate for the
explanation of the puzzle, may do even better when all the sources of uncertainty and money
demand (in the case of minimum balances) are taken into account. I reiterate that this does not
mean that previously proposed explanations do not play a role in accounting for the puzzle - for
some households they may even be the more accurate explanations. All I endeavored to show is
that a model that abstracts from behavioral, self-control, or strategic bankruptcy considerations,
when carefully calibrated, goes a long way toward accounting for the facts of the puzzle in the
data.
While I do not want to overstate the case here, in that the discussion of these additional
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channels of precautionary liquidity demand would have to be more rigorous and nuanced (many
tradeoffs need to be evaluated), I think it is reasonable to treat the results in this exercise as a
potentially lower bound on how large precautionary demand for liquidity may be, and on their
link to the credit card debt puzzle.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents the first available rigorous examination of liquidity demand as an explanation
for the credit card debt puzzle. I examine the hypothesis that there is a significant share of
household expenditures each month that cannot be paid by credit card, so that households need
to keep liquidity in the bank at all times to pay for these expenditures. The data suggest that
there is a significant unpredictable component to these expenses, so households not only hold
the money for pre-committed expenses, but also have an additional stock of liquidity to insure
against such unexpected spending needs. Thus, if a household accumulates credit card debt, but
does not have enough money both for its needed precautionary amount and for debt repayment,
it will optimally choose to revolve the debt in favor of keeping a sufficient supply of liquidity.
The central contribution of the paper is a careful measurement of how much of the puzzle
can be accounted for by the liquidity need hypothesis. After documenting the puzzle carefully
in the data, I pose a dynamic stochastic model of household portfolio choice with two types of
idiosyncratic uncertainty timed in such a way that portfolio decisions have to be made before
spending needs are known. This model successfully accounts, qualitatively, for the salient em-
pirical features of the credit card debt puzzle. The model is then calibrated via a disciplined
match of moments in the data to moments in the model, in such a way that none of the quan-
tities I target in calibration are related to quantities of interest in accounting for the puzzle.
The parameter estimates are in themselves of interest, providing measurements of magnitudes
of unobservable idiosyncratic uncertainty and the elasticity of substitution between cash and
credit goods in micro data. Further, I find that, depending on the calibration, the hypothesis
successfully accounts for all or nearly all (85%-104%) of the households who revolve debt while
having money in the bank, and for a median such household, it accounts for 56-62 cents of every
dollar held in liquid assets. There is a set of compelling reasons to view these results as a lower
bound. Thus, even though there are likely households for which alternative explanations along
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the lines of time inconsistency or strategic bankruptcy behavior are valid, or even dominant, it
should be apparent that liquidity demand - including precautionary demand for liquidity - is a
factor that contributes significantly toward accounting for the puzzle.
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Appendix A Data
A.1 Sample Selection
I use the 2001 wave of the SCF, and the Q2 2000 - Q1 2001 of the CEX, to capture all households
who were interviewed in 2001, and who held credit card debt some time during that period.
In both surveys, I restrict the sample to people of ages between 25 and 64. I drop low-income
outliers below a threshold of $200 per month, and also those who are incomplete income reporters
in either survey. Further, I drop those who fail to report valid asset and credit card debt
information (if a CEX household has no such information in its fifth interview, then I drop it
for all the quarters in which it is present). This leaves me with 2,878 households in the SCF,
and 2,743 households in the CEX, with 2,164 of them present for the entire 12 months of the
survey.
A.2 Household Assets and Subdivision of Population into Subgroups
I select the subgroups with the intention of matching their characteristics as closely as possible
in the two data sets. In the SCF, liquid asset holdings are measured in detail, as are credit card
debt data. The SCF asks the following questions about credit card balances that I use here:
• “After the last payment [on your credit card accounts], roughly what was the balance still
owed on these accounts?”
• “How often do you pay off your credit card balance in full?” Answer choices are: Always
or almost always, Sometimes, Almost never.
¿From the first question, I can clearly distinguish revolving balance from the new purchases
that appear before the bill is paid. As an aside, note that it is well-known that debt information
tends to be underreported in the SCF (Evans and Schmalensee, 1999), but this serves to my
advantage, since at worst it understates the size of the puzzle in the data, or the amount of debt
that households hold. I use the second question to select only habitual credit card debtors to be
in the puzzle group, that is, those who answer “Sometimes” or “Almost never”; of all households
who report to have positive credit card debt at the time of the interview, 77% are in this group.
Liquid assets are defined as all household checking and savings account balances, and I also
include brokerage accounts, because in the CEX there is no way to separate them out. Credit
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cards that I consider are bank-type and store credit cards, that is, those that allow to revolve
debt.
In the CEX, credit card balance information is collected in the second and fifth interviews,
and in the fifth interview, households are also asked the amount they paid in the last year in
finance charges on credit cards (distinct from late fees). The relevant questions in the CEX are:
• “On the first of this month, what was the balance on your credit card account(s)?”
• “What was the amount paid in finance charges on all credit card accounts over the last 12
months?”
As is clear from the first question, it is harder to distinguish revolving debt from new pur-
chases in the CEX, but I can do so fairly reliably using the finance charge question. In the CEX,
credit cards are defined similarly to the SCF, as store and bank-type cards that allow debt to
be revolved. Selecting a threshold of $500 for revolving debt, and assuming it is revolved for
a year, I take all households who paid an average of 14% APR on this balance as credit card
revolvers. (The 14% interest rate is the SCF-reported interest rate paid on average on credit
cards, shown in the text). Again, liquid assets are savings, checking and brokerage accounts.
In both surveys, those who report credit card debt above $500 and liquid assets below $500
(and those who are habitual debtors in the SCF, or paid positive finance charges in the CEX)
are then put in the subgroup “debtors”. The remaining subgroup - those with little non-habitual
debt or no credit card debt - are “savers”.
A.3 Separating Consumption Goods into Groups by Payment Method;
ABA Survey of Consumer Payment Preferences
In looking at household consumption in the CEX, it was necessary to separate consumption into
goods that people have to pay for with liquid instruments (cash, check, debit card) and goods
that can be paid by either credit or liquidity. I separate household expenditures in the CEX into
“cash-only goods”, “cash-or-credit goods”, education and durables. I separate out education and
durables because expenditures for these goods occur rarely, while consumption is continuous but
not measured through expenditure (see Krueger and Perri, 2003). Thus, studying volatility of
expenditure on these goods is uninformative. This is true of cash-or-credit goods to some extent
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Table A.3.1: ABA Survey: Most Used Payment Method by Bill Type
Check, cash,
Bill type direct debit Debit Card Credit Card
Rent or mortgage 99.4 0.3 0.4
Loan or lease 98.2 1.0 0.8
Insurance 96.2 1.2 2.6
Childcare, tuition 91.8 2.2 6.0
Utilities 95.0 2.5 2.5
Charity contributions 96.0 1.3 2.7
Memberships, subscriptions 85.2 3.1 11.7
also, since they include many semi-durable items, such as clothing; it is important that the point
of this exercise is not to compare volatilities across good groups.
To accomplish the separation, I relied on the 2004 Survey of Consumer Payment Preferences
conducted by the American Bankers Association and Dove Consulting. This survey is not
representative of all U.S. households, but is the only up-to-date survey that studies consumer
payment methods. The sample that it does study consists of people with access to internet, so
arguably, these are households who have the broadest payment options, and thus it should give
a fairly accurate idea of payment methods used for most common good groups. In the survey,
consumers are asked how they pay for certain types of goods and services, as well as at certain
types of stores. Tables A.3.1 and A.3.2 present a summary of all results from the survey that
pertain to consumer choice of payment methods. The questions were all phrased in the same
way: “When you make purchases at [type of store], which method of payment do you use most
often?”, and “When you pay for [type of bill], which payment method do you use most often?”
Expenditures on food, alcohol and tobacco deserve special attention. In separating out the
cash-only category, it was important to make a decision regarding goods that consumers mostly
choose to pay by liquid instruments, even though credit cards may be an option. For example,
it is clear from the survey, as well as other general payment method studies by the Federal
Reserve, that households tend to prefer to pay for essentials, such as food, by a check, debit
card, or cash. However, in most supermarkets, credit cards became an option in the mid-1990’s;
a more questionable category is food in restaurants, since many smaller fine restaurants opt not
to accept credit cards. A second issue is that in the CEX, these good groups are goods for
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Table A.3.2: ABA Survey: Most Used Payment Method by Store
Store Cash or check Debit Card Credit Card
Grocery store 45.4 35.7 18.9
Gas station/convenience store 34.1 26.8 39.1
Department store 27.6 26.4 46.0
Discount store/warehouse club 43.4 27.2 29.4
Drug store 47.3 29.7 23.0
Restaurants 42.3 23.4 34.3
Fast food 85.6 7.8 6.6
Transit system 81.4 8.6 10.0
Table A.3.3: Goods Categories for CEX Analysis
Good group Components
Cash-only goods Rent, mortgage, utilities, property taxes, insurance, household
(paid by check, debit, operations, child care, public transportation, health insurance;
cash) food in and out, alcohol, tobacco.
Cash-or-credit goods Apparel, entertainment, gasoline, medical services, medical equipment,
prescription drugs, reading, personal care, membership fees, funeral
expenses, legal fees, etc.
Durables Households furnishings and major appliances, vehicle purchases
Education Tuition and fee expenses, textbook purchases
which the question in the survey asks the household to remember a monthly average spent over
the last three months, rather than an accurate expenditure in each month. This would tend to
depress the measure of consumption volatility of whichever group food is included in. A further
discussion of this group is in the text.
The resulting categories are presented in table A.3.3.
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